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Abstract
In this paper, we tackle the issue of physical adversarial examples for object detectors in
the wild. Specifically, we proposed to generate adversarial patterns to be applied on vehicle
surface so that it’s not recognizable by detectors in the photo-realistic Carla simulator.
Our approach contains two main techniques, an Enlarge-and-Repeat process and a Discrete
Searching method, to craft mosaic-like adversarial vehicle textures without access to neither
the model weight of the detector nor a differential rendering procedure. The experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in the simulator.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved impressive performance in a number of
computer vision tasks, they are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [1] and easily
misled to make wrong predictions. The existence of adversarial examples reveals a non-negligible
security risk in DNN applications, including face recognition [2], object detection [3] and so on.
Adversarial attack algorithms on computer vision models can be divided into two types
by their applicable domains: 1) digital attacks are conducted by directly adding imperceptible
adversarial permutations to pixels of input images [1], while 2) physical attacks modify objects
in the 3D real-world environment or physical simulators [4, 2, 5, 3, 6] and examine whether the
permutations are physically realizable and can stay adversarial under different transformations.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the latter, which is a more direct threat to visual systems in
the physical world.
Compared with the digital one, the physical attacking scenario is more challenging for
the attackers since the adversarial perturbation should be robust to various environments and
possibly destructive transforms. Previous studies that tackle the issue of physical attack vary
in several key factors: attack entry point/object (e.g. stickers on stop signs [3, 7, 5], vehicle
texture [8], 3D mesh norm [6], or universal attack [9]), targeted task/model (e.g. classification [2,
6, 10] and object detection [3, 7, 5]). Since it is too expensive and sometimes impossible to
run experiments in the real world, researchers usually conduct experiments in simulators [8].
However, solving the physical attacking problem in a simulator is still challenging since the
rendering process is non-differentiable if one does not turn to a differentiable renderer.
Our paper attacks a vehicle detector by manipulating the vehicle texture in a photo-realistic
simulator, and the mosaic-like adversarial patterns crafted by our method are constructed by reg-
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ular and colorful blocks. Specifically, we propose a discrete search method to craft the adversarial
texture pattern. Also, we carefully construct the adversarial pattern via an Enlarge-and-Repeat
process, and this process narrows down the pattern search space, which makes it efficient to
apply discrete search. Using the proposed Enlarge-and-Repeat process and the discrete search
attacking method, we achieve remarkable attacking results in physical simulators, and we high-
light that easy mosaic-like adversarial patterns can be a non-negligible threat to modern vehicle
detectors.
2 Related Studies
Physical Attack Adversarial attacks in the real world are first observed by [4] where they found
that images with adversarial permutation printed out on paper remain effective. There have been
many physical attacking studies that attack classifiers: Sharif [2] generated glasses with patterns
to fool facial recognition system; Athalye et al [6] proposed Expectation-over-transformation
(EoT) and constructed physical attacks by with 3D-printed objects; Evtimov [10] used black and
white stickers to attack stop signs. Lu et al [11] pointed out that these methods fail to attack
object detectors [12, 13], which is a more challenging task. Later, several approaches [3, 7, 5]
claimed that detectors are also fragile if some modifications to the loss functions are made,
and region proposals are taken into consideration. The attacks are also performed by adding
permutations to stop signs, which has a planar surface. While most recently, Zhang et al [8] used
a clone network to attack Mask R-CNN [14] with camouflages painted to the vehicle surface in
the CARLA simulator [15]; And Huang et al [9] proposed a universal physical camouflage attack
which can be camouflaged as texture patterns on object surfaces such as human accessories/car
paintings.
Our work is most closely related to [8] in that we all craft adversarial texture of vehicles,
but we perform a more careful construction of the adversarial pattern search space, and employ
a discrete search method instead of using a “clone model” to mimic the black-box behavior. We
introduce our experiences of reproducing their clone model solution and discuss its limitation in
Sec. 4.4.
Object Detection Object detection based on deep learning has long been an important task
and has aroused comprehensive interest. Modern methods include anchor-based and anchor-
free [16, 17] detectors, and the former can be further divided into two-stage [18, 13, 19, 14] and
one-stage [12, 20] methods based on whether region proposals are generated. In this paper, we
use an light-headed RCNN [19] as the targeted model.
3 Methodology
Our goal is to attack an object detector by rendering camouflages all over the car and mislead
the detector so that it would fail to produce bounding boxes with high IoU or misclassify the
car. In this section, we present our attacking algorithm in two parts: 1) we first explain some
details of our physical simulation including rendering strategy and generation of training data;
and then 2) we propose a discrete searching algorithm to perform the black-box attack without
access to neither the model weight of the detector nor a differential rendering procedure.
3.1 Physical Simulation and Camouflage Rendering
We leverage the open-source simulator CARLA [15] to conduct the experiments. The CARLA
simulator is built on Unreal Engine 4, and provides various maps, vehicle models, and enable
one to use simple APIs to manipulate the environment, vehicle state, vehicle texture, camera
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Figure 1: Two ways of generating a camouflage from a pattern.
Upper: Directly resize the pattern by interpolation. Lower: Our
Enlarge-and-Repeat manner.
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Figure 2: The red and
blue points indicate the
transformations at training
and testing time, respec-
tively
state and so on. Given a piece of camouflage pattern, which is of the size of 2048 × 20481, it
can be rendered onto the vehicle surface with Unreal API. The camera sensor we create would
receive rendered 2D RGB pictures of the scene, including the camouflaged vehicle. By changing
the camera transformations (various distance and viewpoints, in our setting), we generate image
data for both training and evaluation.
If the size of the pattern image is smaller than the default configuration above, it would be
resized via interpolation first, which may induce blurring to the original pattern, especially when
the initial size is rather small. Our experimental results show that the attacking performance
degrades when the pattern is highly blurred.
In this paper, we explore the design space of the adversarial camouflage pattern, by adopting
different Enlarge-and-Repeat (ER) configurations. Specifically, assume the pattern is a 2p × 2p
pixels RGB square block, which is much smaller than the whole camouflage texture.To construct
the camouflage texture, instead of directly resizing the pattern unit with interpolation, we first
enlarge each pixel to a 2e×2e pixels block and get a bigger pattern with the length of 2p+e×2p+e;
and then, it’s repeated 2r times both vertically and horizontally to get the final camouflage
texture, a square of length 2p+e+r = 2048. The ER process takes two factors into consideration.
First, in order to make the patterns more conspicuous and robust towards various environmental
factors, one can enlarge each pixel into a small square block. Second, since the camouflage is
rendered onto the whole body except for the windows and tyres, so from different viewing angles,
only part of the pattern can be caught by camera. Thus, a natural idea is to repeat the same
adversarial pattern to make the best use of its adversarial characteristics. Overall, it seems to
be painting a mosaic-like camouflage on the vehicle.
The transformation used in our paper would be elaborated in Sec. 4.
3.2 Discrete Searching
Since the rendering process is generally non-differential, it’s not applicable to update the adver-
sarial pattern using back-propagated gradients. Also, we assume no knowledge of the vehicle
detection model, and aim at black-box attacking the vehicle detection model using only queries.
We conduct the black-box attack by iteratively refining the camouflage using a mutation-based
search method. Note that in 3.1 we have constrained the searching space to a small patch of
pattern instead of the full car surface to increase feasibility. We’ll only use camouflage, i.e., pat-
1The size of the vehicle textures is 2048× 2048 in the CARLA simulator.
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Figure 3: Discrete searching illustration. The searching process from left to right gives examples
of the two mutation strategies, namely randomly and directed. It depends on whether it is the
initialization process and whether the best mutated point outperforms the current point
terns after the ER process, to explain the searching algorithm here. The notations and concrete
description of the algorithm are summarized in Alg. 1, and a graphical illustration is shown in
Fig. 3.
Specifically, we first initialize Nc randomly generated camouflages and select the top Na
of them to be the starting points of the searching. In each inner iteration, nw mutated points
are generated and evaluated. And there are two mutation strategies: 1) scattering inside an
epsilon-ball of l∞ with random direction and step sizes; 2) directed update along a preferred
direction with randomized step sizes. In the first iteration, there is no preferred direction at
every starting point, thus we adopt the randomized scattering mutation strategy, and find the
best mutated point among the nw mutated point. Then the preferred direction δ is determined
by the current point Ci, i = 0, ..., nw − 1 and the best mutated point Cˆi (Line 10, Alg. 1), and
the best mutated point is chosen as the new current point (Line 11, Alg. 1). Then in the next
inner iteration, directed update mutation along the preferred direction would be adopted. In
this way, these two mutation strategies are interleaved. The randomized scattering mutation is
more localized and is finding a direction, and the directed update enables faster exploration of
the search space. One inner loop contains nd iterations of the aforementioned updates, and the
total search process contains nr inner loops.
Meanwhile, we also maintain a set of solid camouflages with the best attacking performances,
namely solid pool, which would be used to generate the starting points of the next inner loop.
And a larger epsilon 2 and no direction guidance is used in the starting points generation of
each inner loop (Line 21, Alg. 1). This global search intends to enhance the exploration to a
larger l∞ norm ball to avoid being stuck in a local minimum.
During the search process in Alg. 1, we evaluate each camouflage pattern by 1) Assigning
the camouflage pattern as the vehicle texture; 2) Capturing the rendered 2D RGB images using
camera sensors with different camera transformations; 3) Running the vehicle detector on the
captured images and calculating the average detection score.
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Algorithm 1 Discrete searching to find adversarial patterns
Input:
Randomly initialize Nc camouflages in the search space Rd, d = H ×W × 3× 256.
Output:
A set of solid camouflages that gains the best attacking performance.
1: Select the top Ns camouflages with the lowest average score to initialize the solid pool
2: for each jr ∈ {0, ..., nr − 1} do
3: Choose top Na(Na < Ns) camouflages from the solid pool to be the starting points, namely
Ci, i ∈ {0, ..., Na − 1}.
4: for each i ∈ {0, ..., Na − 1} do
5: Initialize the diretion δ to be a random matrix of 1,−1H×W .
6: for each jd ∈ {0, ..., nd − 1} do
7: Take nw random searching steps with C
jw
i = Clip(Ci+Random(H,W, 3) · 1 ·δ), jw =
0, ..., nw − 1
8: Select Cˆi, which is the best among the C
jw
i , w = 0, ..., nw − 1
9: if Cˆi is better than Ci then
10: Estimate a rough local direction δ = sign(Cˆi − Ci)
11: Update Ci = Cˆi
12: else
13: Take direction δ to be a random matrix in {1,−1}H×W ,
14: Ci remains unchanged
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: Update solid pool by ranking the original set with all the new ones generated during
searching
19: for each i ∈ {0, ..., Ns − 1} do
20: Take ng random searching steps with C
jg
i = Clip(Ci + Random(H,W, 3) × 2), jg =
0, ..., ng − 1
21: end for
22: Again update solid pool by ranking the original set with all the new ones generated during
searching
23: end for
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment Setup
implementation Details. The hyper-parameters in Algorithm 1 are as follows: we set Nc =
100, Ns = 20 and Na = 5 for the size of initialization, solid pool, and searching starting points,
respectively. nw is set to 20. The inner and outer iteration numbers, nd and no, are set to 3
and 5, respectively. The decreasing of average detection score usually gets quite slow after 5
outer iterations, and thus we get it stopped. As for the mutation parameters, we set 1 = 5 and
2 = 10. We use Light-Head RCNN [19] pretrained on MSCOCO [21] as the targeted object
detector. During training, we use 16 camera transformations: the distances are set as 5 and 8
meters away from the vehicle, and 8 uniformly distributed viewing angles are used for each of
the distances. During testing, we use 96 camera transformations with the distances set as 5,
8, 12 and 15 meters and 24 uniformly distributed viewing angles for each of them. Different
transformations are shown in Fig. 2.
Evaluation Metrics One of the metrics we use is average prediction score Savg, where we take
the highest box prediction that belongs to the car category, and average the results under various
pre-defined camera transformations. Since the detector considers no car detected when the
highest prediction score is lower than a threshold (set as 0.5), we follow UPC [9] to use precision
with a threshold of 0.5 P0.5 as another metric. Our definition is slightly different, by directly
calculate the the ratio between successfully detected vehicles images and the total number.
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Figure 4: Visualization of rendering results under four different ER settings
Baselines Following [8], we compare with two baseline cases, namely clean and random. We
choose black as a standard vehicle color for the clean case, and we randomly generate 100
camouflages in the same manner as the initialization part in Algorithm 1 for the random case. 2
4.2 Experimental Results
We first evaluated the influence of different settings of the Enlarge-and-Repeat process, where
we would use abbreviations for convenience, e.g., Ee-Rr means first enlarging each pixel of the
pattern for 2e times and then repeating it for 2r times, which is presented more concretely
in Sec. 3.1. As shown in Tab. 1, the detector can detect a clean car with Savg = 0.89 and
P0.5 = 0.91. With randomly generated camouflages, we can see that the attacking effect varies
under different ER settings. Specifically, E5-R2 with a medium pattern frequency performs the
best with a drop of 0.33 and 0.34 from the clean baseline for Savg and P0.5, respectively. The
attacking effect gets less remarkable as the frequency gets either higher (E4-R3) or lower (E7-
R0). The visualization of their comparison is shown in Fig. 4. We observed that the two metrics
share the same tendency.
And then we test the effectiveness of our searching strategy, as shown in Tab. 1. With
the same ER setting, compared with the random baseline, Savg and P0.5 further decrease for
[0.09, 0.13] and [0.08, 0.20] points, respectively. Overall, the best attacking results are achieved
by applying E5-R2 and our discrete searching method. Specifically, a drop of 0.46 and 0.52 are
observed in Savg and P0.5, respectively.
Notice that the decreasing is quite remarkable even before the searching stage with ran-
domly initialized camouflages, indicating the contribution of the Enlarge-and-Repeat process
itself, which will be further evaluated in Sec. 4.3.
Method
Savg P0.5
clean random our clean random our
E7-R0
0.89
0.73 (-0.16) 0.64 (-0.25)
0.91
0.75 (-0.16) 0.67 (-0.24)
E6-R1 0.68 (-0.21) 0.56 (-0.33) 0.71 (-0.20) 0.51 (-0.40)
E5-R2 0.56 (-0.33) 0.43 (-0.46) 0.57 (-0.34) 0.39 (-0.52)
E4-R3 0.60 (-0.29) 0.49 (-0.40) 0.59 (-0.32) 0.47 (-0.44)
Table 1: Experimental results of average prediction scores and precision
4.3 Ablation Study
Comparison of different rendering methods We further compared the attacking effect of
different rendering methods in Tab. 2. Specifically, we compared the ER process with the basic
resizing via interpolation. We observed a huge gap between these two methods, and the former
has a rather weak attacking performance compared with the clean case. This might be due to
2Due to the lack of implementation details in their paper [8], and our implementation of their method didn’t
work well, so we didn’t include it as a baseline.
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Methods Avg Score P0.5
Clean 0.89 0.91
Bi-linear-Random 0.85 0.88
ER-Random 0.56 0.57
ER-Search 0.43 0.39
Table 2: Experimental results of different rendering methods
Figure 5: Visualization of detector behaviors under different camera transformations and three
typical cases of bounding box
that the camouflages produced by directly resizing have a continuous color pattern and highly
blurred boundaries. And this pattern is closer to a normal car painting, thus more likely to be
correctly recognized.
Visualization and case study Here we analyze some typical cases of detector behaviors under
attack, and we roughly classify them by the quality of bounding box produced by Region Proposal
Network (RPN) that finally owns the highest score for the car category: 1) In some cases, the
bounding box covers the target well with a lower prediction score; 2) Sometimes the bounding
box only partially covers the target with a further lower prediction score; 3) The best attacking
case is that the detector totally misses the target, and even the background elements have a
higher prediction score. Actually, the detector considers no car detected here when the highest
prediction score is lower than a threshold, usually set as 0.5.
4.4 Discussion on Re-implementation of Previous Approach
Since our work is inspired and closely related to Zhang et al [8], we will discuss about their
method briefly. They use a clone network to mimic the joint behavior of the simulator and the
detection model. And they alternatively train the clone network and craft the adversarial texture
using the gradients of the clone network. Since neither the code nor the implementation detailsf
is provided, we try to implement their solution ourselves. However, we found that clone network
does not work well in our re-implementation. The clone network only mimics the simulator and
detection model well in a small scope of color space, while failing to provide meaningful gradients
after few steps of adversarial updates. Thus, the attacking steps are only attacking the clone
network, instead of the joint system of the simulator and the detection model.
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4.5 Future Work
Currently, the object detector is pre-trained on standard real-world datasets [22, 21] with only
clean examples. It is worthy of exploring whether utilizing a noisy synthesized vehicle dataset
with random surface patterns as extra training sources would increase the model’s robustness.
It shares a similar idea with the widely used adversarial training [23] in digital approaches.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an Enlarge-and-Repeat process and a discrete search method to craft
physically robust adversarial textures for attacking vehicle detection models. Our experiments
are carried out in a photo-realistic simulator. And the experimental results show that the
proposed attacking method successfully fools the vehicle detector from multiple orientations and
distances, and both techniques are effective in crafting stronger adversarial texture.
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